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Background
Researchers have long recognized the importance of a 
central government’s political “commitment” in order to 
mount an eﬀ  ective response to HIV [1-12]. In spite of this 
recognition, empirical research examining the eﬀ  ects of 
political commitment on HIV outcomes remains sparse 
[13], and the concept of political commitment, also some-
times referred to as “political will”, ill-deﬁ  ned [13,15,16]. 
Indeed, a government’s political commitment to respond 
to HIV is often judged loosely in terms of countries’ 
“reputations” for good or bad leadership on HIV with little 
empirical justiﬁ  cation [11,12]. Without clarity about how 
to assess a central government’s political commitment to 
respond to HIV, countries cannot be held accountable for 
inadequately responding to this epidemic, nor can 
committed countries provide lessons about eﬀ  ective policy 
approaches to other countries.
Lack of conceptual clarity over how to assess political 
commitment may furthermore lead researchers to draw 
invalid inferences about the relationship between com  mit-
ment and outcomes. As Youde (2007) notes, researchers 
have tended to infer varying levels of political commit-
ment based on HIV outcomes [10]. Countries with con-
tinued high prevalence rates are blamed for their failure 
to adequately respond, whereas countries that have main-
tained low prevalence rates are praised for keeping their 
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political commitment is problematic because commit-
ment is measured in terms of a successful or unsuccessful 
outcome, instead of being measured separately from the 
outcome of interest [10]. In order to assign causal signiﬁ  -
cance to political commitment, it is necessary to establish 
a relevant counterfactual: what would the HIV infection 
rate in countries with strong commitment have been if 
their commitment had, contrary to fact, been weak?
A number of recent “success” cases in HIV reduction 
draw into question how political commitment contri-
butes to HIV outcomes. Zimbabwe, Kenya and Haiti have 
recently experienced declines in HIV prevalence that can 
be explained by parallel changes in behaviour [17-20]. 
Yet, unlike early country examples, such as Uganda and 
Th  ailand where declines could plausibly be linked to 
explicit government policy responses [21-22], these 
countries are not distinguished for clearly having strong 
political commitment targeting prevention and behaviour 
change. By contrast, Botswana is considered successful in 
developing eﬀ  ective treatment policies, but has not been 
deemed successful at preventing new infections; this is 
what Swidler (2006) refers to as the “Botswana paradox” 
[23]. Without a clear understanding of how political 
commit  ment contributes to HIV outcomes, debate will 
continue about the degree to which declines can be 
attributed to policy responses versus the natural dynamics 
of the epidemic, or other reasons, such as social changes 
and grassroots responses unrelated to government 
commitment [17,24].
Although commonly invoked in the public health 
literature, within political science, the concept of political 
commitment has not been well explored. Political 
scientists consider leadership characteristics to be 
idiosyncratic [25], to lack predictive power [26], and to 
fail to account for long-term diﬀ   erences in policy 
trajectories over time [27,28]. Students of political 
science instead look to more durable reasons for policy 
diﬀ  erences across countries, such as variations in political 
institutions [27-30], political culture [31-32] and trends 
in competitive politics [33-34]. Policies are believed to 
come onto the national agenda not because of the strong 
initiative of individual leaders exclusively, but rather 
because of a conﬂ   uence of several factors coming 
together at the right moment, including the existence of a 
ready-made policy solution, which addresses a persistent 
problem and the opening of a political window of 
opportunity as a result of elections or the advent of a 
crisis [35]. In this way, the commitment of leaders is 
insuﬃ   cient to assure attention to an issue if these other 
factors are not present [35].
In democratic and multi-party systems, the opinions of 
leaders are believed to reﬂ  ect the will of the public, and 
voters can either hold governments accountable for their 
policy responses through voting them out of oﬃ   ce or can 
prospectively elect a leader who pledges her commitment 
to a particular policy platform [36]. International norms 
and policy ideas that are advocated by international 
institutions like the World Bank are also likely to 
inﬂ  uence leaders’ policy choices [37,38]. On the other 
hand, research in other policy domains has shown that 
leaders do not simply follow the preferences of their 
constituents in formulating policy; rather, the content of 
policies diﬀ  er between leaders who are “true believers” in 
a policy compared with leaders who are “converts” and 
follow popular opinion or pressure from international 
institutions [34]. True believers implement policy as 
intended by policy designers, whereas converts imple-
ment policy in a manner that is more in line with their 
actual beliefs. Th  us, even leaders who adopt the same 
policies in name may implement them very diﬀ  erently. 
Politicians can also frame the reasons for their policy 
choices diﬀ   erently to make them more compelling to 
their constituents [39]. One challenge in measuring 
political commit  ment from a political science perspective 
is therefore the question of how to know whether a leader 
is genuinely committed to a policy platform or is feigning 
commit  ment for strategic reasons or under pressure from 
external forces and may therefore be more likely to renege 
on commitments or implement them in a self-defeating 
manner. Leaders have an incentive to support popular 
policies or policies tied to continued inter  national assis-
tance even if ideologically they do not agree with them.
Furthermore, with regular turnover of leadership in 
electoral democracies, there is also the risk that policies 
established under one administration will be reversed if 
there is a change in leadership. Th   e question thus becomes 
one of “credible” commitment, i.e., can actors be assured 
that the government will commit in a way that would make 
later policy reversals highly unlikely [40-42]? Th  e pro-
nounce  ments of the state and its concrete actions con-
stitute its signal of credibility, i.e., of a “credible commit-
ment”, whereby actors expect the state to abide by agreed 
upon or expressed policies and not renege or arbitrarily 
exercise discretionary power [41]. Th   e crucial question in 
assessing the credibility of commitment is therefore 
whether constituents and advocates can identify mecha-
nisms that eﬀ  ectively tie the hands of governments making 
policy reversal diﬃ   cult.
As this brief review illustrates, because political science 
research is primarily interested in explaining political 
phenomena rather than health outcomes, this body of 
research has tended to focus on explaining political 
commitment rather than the eﬀ  ects of political commit-
ment on policy outcomes. Th   is line of research is less useful 
to researchers in the health ﬁ  eld who wish to assess the 
latter relationship. Consequently, the diﬃ   culty that health 
researchers experience in measuring political commit  ment 
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political commitment that links it to outcomes.
Th   ese constraints have left a knowledge gap in the ﬁ  eld 
on how political commitment translates into eﬀ  ective 
government action on HIV outcomes. A number of indi-
cators of HIV-speciﬁ  c political commitment are available, 
which could be used to study the eﬀ  ect of commit  ment on 
government action and HIV outcomes, including the 
AIDS Program Eﬀ   ort Index [43], the United Nations 
General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS (UNGASS) 
Declaration of Commitment Indicators [44], and the AIDS 
Policy Aggressiveness Indicators [45]. Despite their 
potential, these measures have only rarely been used to 
assess the eﬀ  ect of commitment on outcomes.
Methods
Given the gap between the importance that is ascribed to 
political commitment and what is actually known about 
the contribution of political commitment to HIV out-
comes, it is important to establish a framework to assist 
researchers in conceptualizing and measuring political 
commitment in a way that is empirically testable. To that 
end, this article ﬁ  rst critically reviews existing eﬀ  orts to 
assess political commitment to respond to HIV and 
describes and critiques three major components along 
which commit  ment has been conceptualized in the 
literature: (1) expressed commit  ment; (2) institutional 
commitment; and (3) budgetary commitment.
Th  e paper then identiﬁ   es normative and ideological 
aspects of government responses to HIV that cut across 
these three dimensions that further complicate the 
measurement of commitment and suggests ways that 
researchers can approach the measurement of these aspects 
to produce clear research questions. Th   e article additionally 
argues that it is necessary to control in the analysis for 
factors that inﬂ  uence countries’ ability to respond to this 
epidemic in order to draw inferences about the relationship 
between political commitment and HIV outcomes.
Based on this review and political science theory on 
political commitment, the paper then develops a concep-
tual framework to assist researchers in assessing a 
government’s level of political commitment to respond to 
HIV, and provides examples of how the framework can 
be used to draw valid inferences about the eﬀ  ect  of 
political commitment on HIV-related outcomes. Although 
this framework is developed with HIV in mind, we 
encourage researchers to test the robustness of this 
conceptualization of political commitment to assess its 
impact on other public health threats.
Results
Conceptualizing political commitment to respond to HIV
Before attributions of commitment and success can be 
assigned to government policy responses to HIV, 
researchers must ﬁ  rst arrive at a common deﬁ  nition of 
what constitutes “political commitment”. Diﬀ  erent authors 
have deﬁ  ned and operationalized political commitment 
in diﬀ  erent ways. Some researchers have judged political 
commitment based on what governments say rather than 
what they do [1,4,10,14,47-49]. Others have focused on 
the presence of institutional structures that enable a 
response to this disease [50-51] or they have emphasized 
how much governments invest in HIV programmes as a 
measure of commitment [11,45]. Still others have 
examined HIV service delivery outcomes, such as access 
to antiretrovirals (ARVs) and prevention of mother to 
child transmission (PMTCT) programmes, controlling 
for country-level resources in attempts to parse out 
governmental eﬀ  ort to respond to HIV from its ability to 
respond to this disease [11,12].
Examining each of these components in isolation has 
the potential to lead to an incomplete picture of govern-
ment commitment, as well as to invalid inferences about 
the relationship between political commitment and HIV 
policy outcomes. Th  e following section summar  izes 
existing literature on political commitment to respond to 
HIV, grouping studies according to their conceptuali-
zations of commitment and the factors that aﬀ  ect 
countries’ level of commitment.
Expressed commitment
Based on often implicit criteria, researchers have tended to 
infer a government’s commitment to respond to HIV 
according to how often and early key government leaders 
make public statements about HIV [11]. Leaders who are 
willing to address HIV openly, candidly and in a timely 
manner are generally treated as “committed” to respond-
ing to HIV [10,48]. For example, researchers have inter-
preted President Yoweri Museveni’s willingness to speak 
openly about HIV in Uganda as a sign of his commitment 
to controlling the epidemic [7,10,48]. On the other hand, 
former US President Ronald Reagan’s unwillingness to 
speak openly about HIV in the early stages of the epidemic 
was taken as a sign of a lack of commitment to ﬁ  ghting the 
disease [46], as was former South African President Th  abo 
Mbeki’s equivocation on HIV virology [4,10,14,49,52]. 
Expressed commitment has also been conceptualized as 
“symbolic politics”: policy makers can use language and 
images as symbols to set health policy agendas and to change 
conceptions of issues, such as the causes and consequences of 
HIV [16]. Studies have measured verbal commitments by 
analyzing speeches of key leadership [45,49,52], discourse 
analysis of media texts [53], and assessing the general tone 
and tenor of the response [1,4,10,14,48].
Institutional commitment
In addition to verbal expressions of commitment, a 
critical step in many countries is setting up the basic 
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develop a response. Th   e timing of each of these develop-
ments has been consequential in assessing a government’s 
level of commitment. For example, Gauri and Lieberman 
(2006) interpret “when” national AIDS commissions were 
ﬁ  rst introduced in Brazil and South Africa (early versus 
late in the course of the epidemic) as an indicator of a 
proactive response in the former, and a reactive response 
in the latter [25]. By building up infrastructure and 
procedures that are hard to undo once established, 
institutional commitment goes beyond mere proclama-
tions of commitment, creating mechanisms that credibly 
“lock in” the state’s response [25-30]. Th  ese  HIV-related 
institutions – formal and informal “rules of the game” 
[54] – are diﬃ     cult to undo because they come about 
through political processes, including negotiations, 
agreements and the mobilization of human and ﬁ  nancial 
resources.
In Brazil, for example, Nunn (2009) argues that AIDS 
treat  ment institutions introduced early in the response to 
HIV, including formal and informal programmes and 
policies committing the state to AIDS treatment, set the 
country on a path towards a commitment to treatment 
access [51]. Likewise, the Ryan White legislation in the 
US has set up structures and expectations that have made 
the reversal of this legislation and HIV-speciﬁ  c funding 
diﬃ   cult to undo [46].
Measuring the ways that governments translate their 
verbal commitments to ﬁ  ghting HIV into infrastructure, 
policies and procedures (i.e., institutions) therefore con-
sti  tutes an additional component of political commit-
ment that researchers can measure to assess a govern-
ment’s overall level of commitment to respond to HIV. 
Th   e existence of HIV institutions in a country has been 
measured in terms of the establishment of a national 
AIDS commission [25,50], securing a safe blood supply 
[56], developing an HIV sero-surveillance system [56], 
and adopting policies aimed at prevention, treat  ment, 
care and support [25,50,51,56].
Budgetary commitment
Public pronouncements and policy enactments alone 
may not provide a complete picture of governmental 
commitment to respond to HIV without the tangible 
resource allocations to support these pronouncements 
and policies. Commitment is signalled not only as a 
“promise” about the future (e.g., a political leader making 
promises in a media announcement, which may be a 
losing battle or an empty proposal from the beginning), 
but also as the matching up of words with action, 
something that can often only be assessed in hindsight, 
i.e., by comparing what government said and what it 
ultimately did. Lieberman (2009), for example, disagrees 
that leadership qualities, which he views as idiosyncratic, 
should be used as a measure of political commitment 
[45]. Instead, he measures countries’ responses in terms 
of their relative resource allocations, which he views as a 
more objective measure of commitment. Assessing 
commit  ment as resource allocation allows for an 
evaluation of whether commitment lives up to verbal 
rhetoric and institutional commitments [23].
Expenditure actually dispersed rather than pledged 
provides a more concrete measure of commit  ment, but 
the exact measure  ment of resource allocations (e.g., total 
expendi  ture on HIV per capita, the percentage of the 
country’s total budget, etc.) should depend on the 
research question under investigation and the type of 
study (i.e., cross-country comparison vs. single country 
case study). Some studies have assessed commit  ment not 
only in terms of resource allocations, but also in terms of 
service delivery or the availability of anti  retroviral 
therapy (ART) and PMTCT therapies [11,12]. Th  is 
approach is problematic since HIV-related services are 
best thought of as outputs of political commitment, not 
measures of commitment themselves (see section on 
outputs and outcomes).
Normative and evidence-based aspects of political 
commitment
In addition to objective measures of political commit  ment, 
such as the number of public pronouncements made by 
government leaders, the creation (or not) of institutions to 
address HIV, and public expenditures towards HIV, a 
government’s commitment to respond to HIV has also 
been assessed along normative and ideological lines: the 
ethical and human rights aspects of government 
commitment to respond to HIV and the extent to which 
the political response is grounded in scientiﬁ  c evidence 
and international best practices [35-63]. Th  ese  normative 
and evidence-based aspects of commit  ment cut across the 
three dimensions of political commitment and require 
researchers’ discretion over how they are ultimately coded 
with regards to commitment.
Normative aspects of commitment
Perhaps more than for other diseases, the balance 
between the rights of people living with HIV and public 
health prerogatives has been a central tension addressed 
by HIV researchers [57]. HIV has been described as 
“exceptional” for its focus on the protection of the rights 
of individuals living with the disease [55]. Th  ough  there 
has been some debate about whether the rights-based 
approach that characterized the response in the 
developed countries with HIV epidemics that are 
concentrated in speciﬁ  c risk groups is valid in developing 
countries with generalized epidemics, researchers and 
human rights groups routinely assess governments in 
terms of the degree to which their policies constrain the 
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that are disproportionately aﬀ   ected by the epidemic 
[57-61,63-64].
Existing research on political commitment and HIV 
has treated these normative elements of a government’s 
response in various ways. Baldwin (2005) integrates the 
issue of rights-based versus rights-constraining responses 
directly into his research question by asking why 
developed countries have diﬀ  ered in their responses in 
this respect [56]. He distinguishes between countries that 
adopted harsh or coercive HIV policies (e.g., quarantine, 
compulsory institutionalization, and forcible treatment) 
and those that adopted a voluntarist approach (e.g., 
education, counselling, and voluntary behavioural change) 
in their responses.
In Baldwin’s framework, countries that adopt either 
approach could be construed as committed to responding 
to HIV, although through diﬀ  erent methods. A country 
can commit strongly to enforcing coercive policies, re-
inforcing the need for these measures through public 
messages, creating institutions to enforce coercive 
policies through quarantine and forced treatment 
protocols, and dedicating public funds towards this end, 
just as another country could do the same for voluntarist 
policies. Baldwin’s framework, therefore, is agnostic to 
the type of approach adopted; rather, he seeks to under-
stand why states have adopted one approach or the other.
Rather than being agnostic to the normative dimen-
sions of the response, Lieberman speciﬁ  cally deﬁ  nes the 
“policy aggressiveness” of a country as the degree to 
which country policies comport with a “Geneva Consensus” 
approach to responding to HIV [45]. In his deﬁ  nition, the 
“Geneva Consensus” refers to the recognized inter-
national standards, including human rights, put forth by 
the World Health Organization (WHO) and UNAIDS, 
the major international institutions in charge of over-
seeing the global response to HIV [45]. Under Lieber-
man’s assessment, a state that violates international 
human rights standards would not be considered to be 
committed to responding to HIV even if the state 
expresses its commitment, develops institutions towards 
its policy response, and allots funds in support of these 
institutions.
Overall, the normative aspects of HIV policy responses 
raise questions about how to judge a government’s level of 
commitment to respond to HIV. It is not immediately clear 
how to categorize these normative aspects of a response as 
signals of commitment, and researchers’ discretion is 
necessary to decide how to deﬁ   ne commit  ment along 
these lines. Should a government that aggressively 
commits to a response that violates the rights of 
individuals living with HIV be considered as “committed” 
to responding to HIV? Cuba, for example, has been 
criticized for its use of quarantine measures to prevent the 
further spread of HIV in the early years in the epidemic, 
although infection rates in Cuba remain the lowest in the 
Caribbean region [65].
Likewise, some researchers have questioned whether 
Botswana’s routine opt-out testing is ethically sound, 
although the government is committed to this measure, 
which it views as necessary to increase testing rates and 
enhance prevention eﬀ  orts [58]. In Zimbabwe, president 
Robert Mugabe’s homophobic remarks portraying HIV 
infection as a Western disease that is out of step with 
African traditions, has been interpreted as evidence of 
the government’s lack of commitment to ﬁ  ghting  the 
epidemic, even though HIV was being publicly discussed 
[7]. Th  ese examples illustrate that a government can be 
committed to a response deemed unethical by the 
international community. Th  e Cuba example further 
illustrates that there is no necessary relationship between 
the eﬀ  ectiveness of an HIV response and whether or not 
that response respects human rights. By measuring 
commitment exclusively in terms of what is regarded as 
acceptable by some normative standards, researchers 
might draw the wrong conclusions regarding the eﬀ  ect of 
government commitment on HIV-related outcomes.
Evidence-based aspects of commitment
Related to the normative dimensions of measuring 
govern  ment commitment is the question of how to judge 
which types of policy responses - those grounded in 
empirical evidence or more experimental policies con-
form  ing with ideological preferences - should be con-
sidered to represent government commitment to respond 
to HIV. A number of studies have deﬁ  ned  political 
commitment in terms of rhetoric and policies supportive 
of inter  nationally accepted scientiﬁ  c evidence as opposed 
to those lacking scientiﬁ  c support [4,10,52,59-61].
For example, the success of Uganda relative to South 
Africa in combating HIV has been attributed to the fact 
that medical evidence about HIV guided Uganda’s 
response, whereas some of South Africa’s leaders adhered 
to dissident scientiﬁ   c viewpoints [4,10,48-49]. Uganda’s 
more recent turn from emphasizing ﬁ  delity to emphasiz-
ing abstinence has been viewed as being ideologically 
driven by donors’ prioritization of abstinence programmes 
[61,62]. A similar example is the debate over sex educa  tion 
in the US under the administration of George W. Bush, 
which has been described as a struggle between scientiﬁ  c 
consensus and conservative religious ideology [61,63]; yet, 
George W. Bush has committed more in terms of 
budgetary resources to international HIV eﬀ  orts than any 
of the previous U.S. presidents. Th  e refusal of many 
countries, including certain US states and Russia, to adopt 
harm-reduction policies through needle-exchange pro-
grammes consti  tutes another example of the tension 
between scientiﬁ  c evidence and ideological aversions to 
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standards, Lieberman explicitly deﬁ  nes political commit-
ment or “policy aggressiveness” in terms of meeting 
Geneva Consensus scientiﬁ  c standards.
By contrast, Epstein (2007) describes how the inter-
national community ignored evidence on the role of male 
circumcision in reducing the spread of HIV in Africa, 
and continued to promote condom use as a primary 
preven  tion strategy despite lack of evidence on its 
eﬀ  ectiveness [62]. Because scientiﬁ  c evidence is deeply 
contested and evidence continues to accrue, theories that 
were once on the fringe, such as male circumcision, have 
become accepted as best practices and adopted by policy 
makers, whereas standards that are now considered 
ineﬀ  ectual, such as the exclusive promotion of condom 
use in Africa, were at one time the accepted dogma. By 
measuring commitment exclusively in terms of 
commitment to evidence-based policies, researchers run 
the risk of excluding policies that might actually be 
eﬀ  ective, but that have not yet been proven eﬀ  ective. 
Because political logic and empirical evidence are often 
in tension, researchers, who employ a measure of 
commitment agnostic to adherence with best practices, 
may arrive at very diﬀ  erent conclusions from researchers, 
who assess commitment in terms of policies’ comporting 
with science.
In addition, a possible unintended consequence of 
measuring political commitment in terms of compliance 
with international standards is that countries might view 
adhering to global best practices under the threat of 
being criticized for a lack of commitment as a tool of 
international institutions that impedes their autonomy. 
Due to this international pressure, leaders who are 
concerned about international reputation might be less 
willing to experiment with cutting-edge policies that lack 
suﬃ   cient empirical support but are nonetheless eﬀ  ective.
Alternatively, policymakers who wish to demonstrate 
their independence from international pressure may 
support fringe policies in spite of the risk these policies 
pose. In general, policy makers must often make policy 
decisions in the absence of adequate information and 
with equal attention to the reaction of their constituents 
as to the eﬀ  ectiveness of their policy choices [36].
Measuring normative and evidence-based aspects of a response
Given the conceptual challenges posed by the normative 
and evidence-based elements of a government’s response, 
researchers should understand the trade-oﬀ  s of deﬁ  ning 
commitment in one way or another, but should at 
minimum be explicit in how they are deﬁ  ning commit-
ment. If researchers adopt approaches agnostic to the 
normative and evidence-based aspects of the response, 
they may choose normatively and ideologically ambigu  ous 
measures of political commitment, e.g., number of 
mentions of HIV in speeches (regardless of tenor), number 
of HIV-related policies adopted (regard  less of content), 
and total expenditures on HIV (regard  less of purpose).
Alternatively, to assess commitment in terms of corres-
pondence with rights-based policy guidelines, govern-
ments can be measured as committing to a rights-based 
response verbally through public pronouncements that 
are supportive of the rights of aﬀ  ected groups, institu-
tionally through laws and legislation explicitly protecting 
the rights of aﬀ   ected groups, and in terms of budget 
allocations to meet the explicit needs of aﬀ  ected groups. 
Likewise, should researchers decide to measure commit-
ment exclusively in terms of commit  ment to evidence-
based policy, the correspondence of commit  ment with 
medical evidence can be measured in terms of what 
governments say (e.g., questioning whether HIV causes 
AIDS), whether governments adopt policies that are 
evidence-based (e.g., abstinence-only or compre  hen  sive 
sex education), and whether they allocate resources 
towards evidence-based treatments and pro  grammes 
(e.g., towards ART rather than towards “therapies” of 
unproven eﬀ  ectiveness).
In sum, based on how the term has been employed and 
operationalized in previous studies, political commit-
ment encompasses what governments say (expressed 
commitment), what policies they establish (institutional 
commitment) and what they invest (budge  t  ary commit-
ment), but each of these three dimensions of commitment 
have normative and evidence-based aspects that need to 
be considered in a conceptualization and empirical test of 
commitment.
Determinants, eff  ect modifi  ers and mediators of political 
commitment
To accurately draw inferences about the eﬀ  ect of political 
commitment on HIV outcomes, other factors that either 
determine both commitment and an outcome or modify 
the potential eﬀ   ect of commitment on the outcome 
should be accounted for. A growing body of literature, 
summarized in the following paragraphs, has examined 
why govern  ments may or may not be committed to 
responding to HIV, which is consequential for under-
standing the eﬀ  ects of commitment on HIV outputs and 
outcomes.
Additionally, an understanding of the deter  minants of 
political commitment can assist researchers in thinking 
about how to build political commitment where it is 
lacking and an understanding of factors modifying or 
mediating the eﬀ  ect of political commitment can help 
identify intervention to improve outcomes at any level of 
commitment.
Studies have considered the following variables as 
either determinants or eﬀ  ect modiﬁ  ers or mediators of 
political commitment: (1) the capacity of the state to 
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(2) the type of regime and governance [6-8,70,71]; (3) the 
hetero  geneity of the population [25,45]; (4) the magnitude 
of the epidemic [3,11,45,69]; (5) the type of response to 
past epidemics [51,56]; (6) the intensity of international 
assis  tance [45,72]; and (7) the level of civil society involve-
ment [73-76]. It is important for researchers to take such 
factors into account in their analyses of political commit-
ment to respond to HIV because diﬀ  erent countries have 
diﬀ   erent baseline abilities to respond to this epidemic 
[11,12].
State capacity, which refers to the ability of the state to 
“implement decisions, mobilize resources, and enforce 
rules” [68,69], can determine the ability of its health 
sector to scale up interventions, absorb ﬁ  nancial 
resources, and expand HIV services [68,69]. A state may 
be committed to political action, but lack the capacity to 
eﬀ   ectively carry out policy. Analyses of the eﬀ  ect  of 
political commitment on outcomes should therefore 
examine in how far state capacity modiﬁ  es or mediates 
commitment eﬀ  ects. Commonly used proxies for state 
capacity are economic development, govern  ment 
revenues and outlays, and physical infrastructure. For 
example, researchers have used as measures of state 
capacity to aﬀ  ect HIV outcomes, per capita gross national 
income, government expenditure on social services, 
secondary school enrolment, the ratio of healthcare 
providers to the population, the percentage of paved 
roads, and direct tax collection [68,69].
Th  e type of regime of a country (democratic or 
authoritarian) has been hypothesized as a deter  minant of 
government commitment to ﬁ  ghting HIV [6,7,  8,  70,71]. 
Democratically elected governments should theoretically 
be more likely to commit to policies signalled as preferred 
by their constituents [36]. However, with critical 
exceptions like South Africa, in their respective analyses 
of HIV in Africa, Patterson (2006), Bor (2007) and 
Dionne (2011) ﬁ  nd that demo  cratic institutions do not 
predict strong AIDS policy responses [7,70]. Beyond 
regime type, good governance more broadly reﬂ  ected in 
the quality of political, economic and administrative 
processes, such as fair elections, transparent management 
of economic resources, and citizens’ respect for the 
country’s institu  tions, has been hypothesized to improve 
political commit  ment to respond to HIV [8,71,77]. Using 
the World Bank governance indicators, Menon-Johann-
son (2005) ﬁ   nds evidence for a relationship between 
governance and HIV prevalence, whereas Reidpath and 
Allotey (2006) argue that causality in this relationship 
cannot be established without controlling for a range of 
structural factors correlated with governance, such as 
economic develop  ment and physical infrastructure [8,71, 
77]. Since regime type and governance may also inﬂ  uence 
govern  ment commitment, these variables should be 
accounted for in assessing the eﬀ  ects of government’s 
level of commitment to respond to HIV.
Characteristics of society that are outside the control of 
government also modify the eﬀ  ectiveness of commitment 
on outputs and outcomes. Ethnic diversity has been 
posited as a reason for low levels of public service 
provision (such as HIV treatment or prevention inter-
ventions), via constraints on intergroup collective action 
and decision making [78-79]. Boundary institu  tions, such 
as discriminatory employment or educational policies or 
group-diﬀ  eren  tiated personal law, can reinforce ethnic 
and religious divisions, which can hinder the ability of 
countries to commit to ﬁ  ghting HIV [25,45].
Higher levels of socio-economic inequality are also 
believed to depress the provision of public services 
through reduced social cohesion and increased disagree-
ments over how scarce resources should be allocated 
[80-81]. Heterogeneity of societies can substantially 
impact how risk is constructed around HIV [47], as well 
as how resources are allocated to individuals aﬀ  ected by 
HIV infection [36,70]. Governments with more hetero-
gene  ous populations, both ethnically and econo  mi  cally, 
may there  fore have a harder time committing to HIV 
policy or translating verbal commitments into action.
Given the varying types and magnitudes of epidemics 
(concentrated versus generalized; late versus early stage; 
high versus low HIV incidence), countries diﬀ  er in their 
empirical urgency of addressing HIV. Th   e magnitude of 
the epidemic, which may be equally attributable to 
underlying social and behavioural factors as to the 
political response, aﬀ  ects the saliency of the problem and 
thereby has the potential to increase public demand for 
action [6,7], which in turn should increase political 
commitment [70]. Th  e challenge of implementing HIV 
interventions may also be greater for countries that have 
rapidly increasing HIV epidemics. In addition, more 
committed governments should also be more eﬀ  ective at 
reducing the epidemic, introducing simultaneity in the 
relationship between commitment and HIV outcomes. 
Since questions of the eﬀ  ects of political commitment 
usually cannot be investigated in controlled experiments, 
researchers need to consider observational study designs, 
such as natural experiments, controlled before/after 
studies, or regression discontinuity, which can provide 
rigorous counterfactuals for  causal inferences in the 
absence of experimental intervention.
Researchers have further noted the path dependency of 
government responses to diseases: past commitment can 
aﬀ  ect future commitment [27,28,51,56]. Path dependency 
is a concept that has been used to explain the persistence 
of often ineﬀ   ectual public policies in political science 
[29,54]. For example, Baldwin ﬁ  nds that past responses to 
contagious diseases conditioned countries’ responses to 
HIV, leading some European countries to adopt harsher, 
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rights-enabling policies [56]. Likewise, Nunn ﬁ  nds that 
institutions developed in the early stages of Brazil’s 
response inﬂ  uenced subsequent aspects of its response 
and conditioned government commitment to responding 
to HIV [51]. Researchers should consider the legacy of 
existing institutions and how they condition commitment 
to HIV.
Th  e contribution of the donor and non-governmental 
sector to a country’s political commitment must also be 
taken into account in order to avoid confounding 
government eﬀ   ort with non-governmental eﬀ  ort  in 
address  ing HIV. Non-governmental and governmental 
commitment may aﬀ   ect each other in complex ways. 
First, donor commitments tend to go towards countries 
that have signalled a political commitment to respond to 
HIV [45]. At the same time, donor contributions may 
replace domestic spending on HIV.
Second, numerous studies stress the role of social 
movements and civil society pressure in catalyzing 
greater government attention to HIV [23,73-76]. In some 
countries, however, civil society organizations have taken 
over functions in the HIV response that are traditionally 
considered to be state functions, and donor funds have 
increasingly bypassed the state, directly supporting civil 
society. Strong civil society engagement in the HIV res-
ponse can therefore reduce the need for state commit-
ment as the state delegated the response to non-state 
actors and may make the state appear less committed 
than it actually is [73]. Research on political commit  ment 
should investigate the eﬀ  ects of donor eﬀ  orts and civil 
society responses on government commitment to ﬁ  ght 
HIV.
In sum, the factors that we have outlined (state 
capacity, governance, fractionalization and heterogeneity 
of the populace, the magnitude of disease, historical 
institutions, and non-governmental contributions) may 
act as determinants, eﬀ  ect  modiﬁ   ers or mediators of 
govern  ment commitment to respond to HIV. Th  ese 
factors should be accounted for in analyses seeking to 
explain the eﬀ   ect of political commitment on HIV-
related outputs and outcomes.
Outputs and outcomes of political commitment
Th   e extent to which a government politically commits to 
respond to HIV has important implications for how the 
epidemic develops and impacts those aﬀ   ected by the 
disease. An important distinction, which we reﬂ  ect on in 
our conceptual framework, is between outputs and out-
comes of political commitment to respond to HIV 
(Figure 1). Outputs are directly linked to a government’s 
institu  tional and budgetary commitment to responding to 
HIV, and out  comes are only linked to political commit-
ment via their relationship with outputs. Examples of 
outputs that may be aﬀ  ected by political commitment are 
knowledge, attitudes and beliefs about the HIV epidemic, 
and HIV prevention, care and treatment coverage, whereas 
out  comes refer to HIV prevalence, incidence, morbidity 
and mortality. Political commitment is required to plan, 
set up and fund HIV interventions, so that intervention 
coverage is likely to be a function of commitment. Political 
commitment, expressed in politicians’ speeches and public 
discussions, can aﬀ  ect a population’s knowledge, attitudes 
and beliefs about the HIV epidemic, which in turn may 
inﬂ  uence behaviour and HIV health outcomes. Institutions 
and budgetary allocations can impact HIV outputs, such 
as access to treatment and prevention services, which in 
turn may aﬀ  ect outcomes.
Some studies measure commitment directly in terms of 
service delivery or the availability of ART and PMTCT 
therapies [11,12]. Yet, access to services is better viewed 
as an output of commitment rather than a measure of 
commitment itself.
Discussion
Applying the framework to assess the eff  ect of political 
commitment on HIV outcomes
What is clear from this discussion is that political 
“commit  ment” to combat HIV is a complex construct 
made up of diﬀ  erent dimensions and aﬀ  ected by diﬀ  erent 
aspects of commitment. Although studies vary in their 
focus, a complete picture of a government’s political 
commitment necessitates accounting for each component 
of commitment. For example, governments may verbally 
commit to HIV, making public pronouncements for 
instru  mental reasons (e.g., to attract donor funds), but 
fail to translate this rhetoric into action in the form of 
laws or investments in actual programmes. Conversely, 
governments may remain silent, but have all of the 
institutional infrastructure in place and invest resources 
towards HIV. It is also possible for governments to commit 
institutionally, but to underfund programmes, leading to 
incomplete policy implementa  tion. Govern  ments may 
invest in programmes but under  mine them through public 
discourse or lack the institutional capacity to make use of 
funds. Judgements on the level of political commitment 
should therefore take simultaneous account of diﬀ  erent 
components of commitment.
Even within a single country, political competition can 
lead to rival frames with political parties appealing to 
varying constructions of HIV risk and pressuring for 
diﬀ   erent kinds of policy responses. In federal states, 
commitment may vary across relatively autonomous sub-
national units making a uniform assessment of political 
commitment impossible. For federal states, the frame-
work can be applied in microcosm to assess how diﬀ  er-
ences in levels of commitment across sub-national units 
aﬀ  ect HIV outcomes. Alternatively, national policy or the 
Fox et al. Journal of the International AIDS Society 2011, 14(Suppl 2):S5 
http://www.jiasociety.org/content/14/S2/S5
Page 8 of 13average across states can be used to aggregate country 
responses.
Researchers must also use their discretion and be 
explicit in their choices concerning how to code govern-
ment commitment according to its responsiveness to 
human rights and ethical standards (i.e., normative 
aspects) and the use of medical evidence in line with 
inter  national standards (i.e., evidence-based aspects). In 
addition, background factors that aﬀ  ect the ability of the 
state to respond should be taken into account in assessing 
a country’s level of commitment. A country with weak 
state capacity (e.g., because of hetero  geneity and frac-
tion  ali  zation or a low resource base) may ﬁ  nd it more 
diﬃ     cult to translate commitment into an eﬀ  ective 
response.
Th  ough it is tempting to attribute rapidly increasing 
or declining infection rates to political commitment, 
even if commitment is correctly speciﬁ  ed for a given 
country, a number of challenges arise in causally linking 
commit  ment to HIV outcomes, particularly reduced 
incidence and HIV-related mortality [24]. Scholars 
should be aware that even when a country scores highly 
on its level of commitment to respond to HIV, its 
observed success in managing the epidemic may be 
causally related to something else (e.g., the eﬀ  orts of 
civil society groups or a natural decline in the epidemic). 
Ideally, observational studies should employ strong 
approaches to identify causal eﬀ  ects using, for instance, 
natural experiments or sharp discontinuities in commit-
ment levels.
Figure 1. Framework for assessing political commitment to respond to HIV.
Determinants, effect
modifiers and mediators of
political commitment
•  State Capacity
•  Regime type and
governance
•  Responses to earlier
health epidemics
•  Ethnic and social
fragmentation
•  Magnitude of the
epidemic
•  Response of non-state
actors (e.g., civil
society)
•  International actors
(pressure and donor
funding)
Components of political
commitment
Expressed commitment
•  Public pronouncements in
line with scientific evidence
and internationally
recognized standards
Institutional commitment
•  Establishment of AIDS
bureaucracies
•  Adoption of policies, laws,
legislation, and regulations
•  HIV surveillance and
monitoring and evaluation
mechanisms
Budgetary commitment
•  Disbursement and allocation
of funds towards HIV
programming
Normative and evidence-based
aspects:
•  Ethics and human rights
•  Scientific evidence
Outputs and outcomes of
political commitment
Outputs
•  Access to HIV
prevention services
•  Access to care and
treatment
Outcomes
•  HIV/AIDS-related
morbidity & mortality
•  HIV incidence
•  HIV prevalence
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more concrete and objective than expressed commit-
ments, which may be rhetorical, instrumental or sym-
bolically driven, these components can be thought of as a 
form of “demonstrated” commitment rather than mere 
“stated” commitments. Countries can then be assessed 
on the degree to which their stated commitments corrres-
ponds with demonstrated commitments. To demon  strate 
this conceptualization of commitment, we can imagine a 
four-by-four table that would divide countries according 
to their levels of stated commitment and demon  strated 
commitment: (1) both stated and demon  strated commit-
ment (credible commitment); (2) stated but not demon-
strated commitment (rhetorical commit  ment); (3) 
demon  strated commitment without stated commit  ment 
(objective commitment); and (4) low stated and demon-
strated commitment (uncommitted) (Figure 2).
Examples of countries that have credibly committed to 
HIV both in terms of actions and words could include 
Uganda, Botswana, Brazil and Th  ailand [11]. In these 
countries, institutional and budgetary commitments have 
been backed up by verbal commitments from the 
governments and have developed over time to a point 
where reversal of course is more diﬃ   cult to achieve than 
a continuation. An example of a country with rhetorical 
commitment might be Senegal, which was praised early 
on by researchers for its openness to discussing HIV and 
the government’s explicit engagement with religious 
leaders in the response [82,83]. In terms of actual 
expenditures on HIV, however, Senegal’s budget remains 
modest and performance on outputs, such as ARV 
coverage for its small population of people living with 
HIV, low [11].
Rwanda, on the other hand, has been extremely eﬀ  ec-
tive at allocating resources for treatment and creating 
necessary institutions [11], but has issued few public 
statements highlighting HIV as a public health threat, 
leading some to question whether the country’s commit-
ment to HIV is more strategic than genuine [84].
Finally, many countries might fall into the category of 
uncommitted, including Russia, India and China. Th  ese 
countries have not, or have only very recently, begun to 
publicly address HIV as a substantial public health threat 
and to build substantial institutional or budgetary 
commitments to respond to HIV [11]. For Russia and 
China, this is the case even though both countries have 
more state capacity, particularly in the form of ﬁ  nancial 
resources, than many other developing countries to 
address this disease [11].
Bringing in normative and evidence-based dimensions 
to these examples could add additional nuances to the 
interpretations. Although generally interpreted as com-
mit  ted, Botswana’s routine opt-out testing policy has 
been criticized by international human rights observers 
[58], and Th  ailand’s lack of harm-reduction policies for 
injection drug users has been scorned [85]. Researchers 
have at various times questioned the evidence base of 
Uganda’s response, which committed to HIV prevention 
interventions at times when these interventions have 
lacked strong scientiﬁ   c support or were scientiﬁ  cally 
contested [48,62]. Using an objective measure of verbal 
commitment agnostic to contents, South Africa would be 
considered verbally committed, even though a large 
amount of the attention that past leaders have paid was 
to scientiﬁ   cally contested prevention and treatment 
strategies. Likewise, the Gambia’s president, Alhaji Yahya 
Jammeh, has both verbally committed to his own herbal 
remedy for HIV and set up a parallel state-run treatment 
programme consisting of Islamic and traditional 
medicines [86].
Th   ese cases would have to be tested more systematically 
using available metrics (e.g., UNGASS and AIDS 
Program Eﬀ  ort Index indicators), discourse analysis of 
government speeches, and other appropriate methods. 
Th  e type of commitment should also be matched with 
relevant outcomes, as in the case of Uganda, whose stated 
and demonstrated commitments have been oriented 
towards prevention, whereas Brazil and Botswana have 
emphasized treatment.
In spite of the challenges involved in measuring 
political commitment and coding countries accordingly, 
there are steps that researchers can take to assess the 
causal association between political commitment and 
HIV outcomes. Our examples are illustrations of how the 
framework can be applied in a more systematic manner.
As outlined in this paper, the steps that researchers 
may take to determine whether policy had an eﬀ  ect on 
HIV outcomes are the following:
1. Evaluate expressed commitment, including the frequency, 
timing and content of statements by key leadership.
2.  Assess institutional commitment in terms of the 
presence of laws, policies, procedures and institutions 
addressing HIV prevention, care and treatment.
Figure 2. Combinations of commitment and country cases.
Stated commitment
Credible commitment
(e.g., Uganda, Botswana,
Brazil, Thailand)
Objective commitment
(e.g., Rwanda?)
Demonstrated
commitment
Rhetorical commitment
(e.g., Senegal?)
Uncommitted
(e.g., Russia, China,
India)
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actual resources pledged and allocated towards HIV 
preven  tion, care and treatment.
4.  Judge the alignment of the response with human 
rights, ethical standards, and scientiﬁ  c evidence, and 
decide whether to adopt a measure that deﬁ  nes 
commit  ment according to normative and evidence-
based aspects of the response or a measure that is 
agnostic to these standards.
5. Account for state capacity with explicit consideration 
of international and non-governmental contributions.
6.  Gauge performance on outputs and outcomes and 
align  ment with the timing and type of policy response 
undertaken and, where possible, use strong obser  va-
tional quantitative study designs to identify causal 
eﬀ  ects.
7. Consider alternative explanations for outcomes (e.g., 
social and behavioural factors unrelated to political 
commitment).
Conclusions
Assessing political commitment to respond to HIV is not 
a straightforward process. It is made complex by the fact 
that commitment has several dimensions (expressed, 
institutional and budgetary) and aspects (normative and 
evidence-based) along which a country can be judged. In 
general, better studies of commitment take into account 
more of these dimensions, but not every research 
question calls for evaluating each of these components. 
In addition, domestic political processes are inﬂ  uenced 
by a number of factors, which should be accounted for in 
assessing the relationship between commitment and HIV 
outcomes, because they confound, modify or mediate the 
relationship.
Despite these complexities, there are speciﬁ  c steps that 
researchers can take to accurately assess a country’s level 
of political commitment to respond to HIV and how this 
commitment ultimately inﬂ  uences HIV outcomes.
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